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UnevenDevelopment, Uneven
Response: The Relentless Search for
Meaningful Regulation of GVCs
Jonathan Morris, Jean Jenkins
and Jimmy Donaghey
The regulation of employment in global value chains (GVCs) is a story of
the interaction of corporation and state in transnational space, where uneven
international development has allowed the commodification and exploitation of
international labour. Global standards are well articulated by bodies such as the
International LabourOrganization (ILO) andUN.We knowwhat ‘decent work’
should look like as well as what all workers should enjoy as basic employment
and human rights. Yet, internationally, the different mechanisms of private and
public regulation fail at the point of implementation and across the world we
see no fundamental shift in the condition of labour in terms of its capacity for
social or economic upgrading. This article examines the regulatory mechanisms,
and outcomes of regulation, of industrial relations in GVCs. It commends a
future research agenda to illuminate the interaction between different sources
of standards and rules and the complexities of intersecting private and public
regulation, in the pursuit of enforceable, meaningful regulation of work and
employment in international supply chains.
1. Introduction
As engines of growth in contemporary capitalism, the dynamics of global
value chains (GVCs) demand the attention of labour scholars. While early
iterations of GVC theory (Gereffi 1994; Gereffi et al. 2005) and global
production network (GPN) analysis (Dicken et al. 2001) focussed on inter-
firm power relations (i.e. relations between capital) and largely ‘neglected or
generally understated labour as an analytical category’ (Taylor et al. 2015: 5,
emphasis in original, in recent years there has been a growing literature on
conditions of work and employment in value chains. Latterly, nomatter which
analytical lens is used for analysis of the supply chain, be that GVC or GPN,
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the issue of labour’s ‘place’ has becomemore central to the debate. In no small
part, this is due to an intensifying focus on the human and environmental
costs of failure to establish and enforce minimal labour standards across
transnational space (e.g. Bartley 2018a;Newsome et al. 2015).However, as will
be developed below, building industrial relations institutions with the capacity
to fulfil the UNGuiding Principles on Business and Human Rights has come
a poor second to vested interests in capital accumulation.
This article considers the regulation of employment in GVCs in the
context of uneven international development and the premise that GVCs
operate primarily in the interests of global capital. In particular, multinational
corporations (MNCs) have taken advantage of deregulation and globalization
to fragment production, while seeking out cheap sources of labour where
possible (Peck 2004). This often takes the form of outsourcing production to
legally independent suppliers, over whose actions the MNCs exert significant
power but for whose action they have no legal liability. Alternatively, some
have argued that as the key contemporary drivers of economic development,
‘[f]inding ways to improve working conditions in GVCs is a policy priority
for governments, international organizations, unions, corporations and non-
governmental organizations’ (Robertson 2020: 1), but this is a view heavily
contested in the GVC literature.While it may be claimed that absolute poverty
has been addressed by the expansion of international capital (at least pre-
Covid-19 pandemic), relative poverty persists and grows: the ordinary worker
may only be made slightly less poor by their earnings. The predicted social
and economic upgrading of workers through their work has largely failed to
materialize (Barrientos et al. 2011) and, as Rani and Grimshaw (2019: 581)
note,
the gap between richest and poorest is wideningwithin countries, the labour share of
income is declining; gender inequalities in earnings are persistent; inter-generational
inequalities are accumulating; entire regions of the world are falling behind; and
large portions of the world’s workforce (in high- and low-income countries) have
experienced real wage stagnation.
While GVCs are said to proffer a number of advantages for both host
countries and labour in terms of employment opportunities, increased
incomes, access to markets, intensified competition and technological
upgrading (Bamber and Staritz 2016; Farole 2016) the line between
exploitation and development is a fine one. For example, the ability of
countries to upgrade has been shown to be limited and context-specific
(Morris and Wilkinson 2004; Wilkinson et al. 2001) and if suppliers to
international brands are to be able to survive (let alone upgrade) in highly
competitive markets, then research shows that the terms of conditions for
labour may have to be downgraded (e.g. Anner 2019; Hammer and Plugor
2019; Selwyn 2017). With labour’s situation not substantially improved and
persisting inequality both within and between states, there are a number of
major questions to be addressed in relation to the rules that govern work and
employment in GVCs.
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This article utilizes the ‘Protect, Respect, Remedy’ framework embodied in
theUNGuiding Principles on Business andHumanRights (also known as the
Ruggie Framework,UN2011) in structuring its analysis of the respective roles
of the state and business, and the implications for labour, in the regulation of
work in transnational space. It comprises four main sections. First, in terms of
‘Protect’, we consider the current state of rule-making and standard setting in
the international arena. In Section 3, we evaluate the extent to which there has
been protection and respect of statutory and private-sector commitments to
labour standards, noting briefly how many of labour’s gains in the twentieth
century have been lost and considering the various means by which twenty-
first century institutions are being created. Section 4 of the article examines the
potential effect of themulti-layering of private and public rules and regulation
in terms of remedying extant wrongs. The final section considers a worthwhile
future research agenda, with reference to issues raised by other papers in this
volume and a comment on the profound, but as yet uncertain, implications of
COVID-19 for global production.
2. Rule-making and standard setting in GVCs: the state’s duty to protect
The ‘rules of employment are shaped by their legal, political, economic, social
and historical context’ (Edwards 1995: 5), and will be imposed unilaterally
or agreed jointly by the various parties to the employment relationship.
However, such context takes on new meaning in the case of the GVC,
where fragmented employment relationships play out on a transnational
scale. Since ‘a neoliberal free-market utopia [was] unleashed by globalisation’
in the 1980s, (Munck 2002: 5) global capital has expanded in the context
of ‘falling regulatory barriers to international trade, significant advances
in communication technologies and declining transportation costs, which
facilitate[d] the dispersion of production activities across space’ (Gibbon et al.
2008). In this context, the ‘hypermobility of capital’ and attendant global shift
in sites of production from what might be crudely called the ‘global north’
to the ‘global south’ has been implicated in a ‘race to the bottom’ in labour
conditions ‘on a world scale’ (Silver 2003: 4).
This global shift has been associated with significant changes in the
approach of actors. Take states, for example, where the international mobility
of capital has led to a significant shift in terms of their regulatory role. As
argued by Cerny (1997), the function of states may shift to being one of
increasing competitiveness rather than protecting citizens as, in the context of
uneven global development, attracting MNCs to source from their country
is viewed as a mechanism for developing economically. Thus, states and
governments often have incentives to maintain competitiveness by having low
labour standards, weak regulation and being active or complicit in actions
to suppress union organizing (e.g. Anner 2015; Bair et al. 2020; Barrientos
et al. 2019). In this context, the premise that newly industrializing regions
of the world lack the necessary statutory instruments to protect employment
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rights and workers may therefore be better served by corporate-driven, private
regulation, is highly contested. Bartley (2018a: 38–41) makes a crucial point
when he argues that ‘regulatory voids’ and ‘governance gaps’ rarely exist
on statute books unless deliberately created by weak implementation of
standards and deliberate omissions that give the misleading appearance of
‘empty [regulatory] spaces’.
In such conditions, the weak associational and/or structural power of
organized labour along a global chain of production is increasingly unlikely to
provide the leverage necessary to pressure the employer to bargain collectively
in a process of free and voluntary joint regulation (Reinecke and Donaghey
2015). Furthermore, it is clear that in the process of capturing value from
production, corporations find compliance with some rules more important
than others. While service or product specifications and standards may be
observed, labour standards are far more vulnerable to non-compliance by
states and corporations alike (Bartley 2018a: 2). That accountability for
exploitative, poor conditions of work is evaded is due in no small part to
there being ‘no government at the global level’ that can enforce universal
international standards along the supply chain (see Ruggie 2014:5).
While there have been a number of intergovernmental efforts to increase
MNC responsibility for employment in their suppliers, their efficacy has
been limited, to say the least. As far back as 1976 the OECD published
its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (revised and updated in 2000).
This was followed in 1977, by the International Labour Organization (ILO)
Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multi-national Enterprises
and Social Policy (last updated in 2017) and in 2000 the UNGlobal Compact
was published. All contained provisions around the regulation of work
within the supply chain but with no meaningful means of implementation
or remedification (Compa 2004, 2008). More recently, the UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (Ruggie Framework) expressed
clear responsibilities for states and corporations alike, irrespective of place,
and provided universal standards to inform a system of international
governance. This Ruggie (2014:5) defined as ‘the systems of authoritative
norms, rules, institutions and practices by means of which any collectivity,
from the local to the global, manages its common affairs’. In the Ruggie
framework, the state is assigned a clear duty to protect workers from
vested interests including business, the corporation has a duty to respect
the human rights of their workers and the law of the land, and both state
and corporations are enjoined to provide access to remedy in the case of a
violation. However, in order that such voluntary standards may be taken up, it
requires that private actors engage in voluntary restraint (Ruggie 2001, 2007).
This does not always follow, though much effort is devoted by corporations
in projecting just such an impression. As Wheeler (2015) argues, the lack of a
meaningful transnational legal system means the approach may be dependent
on whether public opinion is enough to move individual MNCs towards
meaningful action.
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Alongside and in tune with the Ruggie framework, stands the ILO with its
100 year history of aiming for a better world of work and higher standards of
transnational regulation. The structures underpinning the ILO are a strong
remnant from the economic and political models which dominated until
the 1970s: employment regulation being based in broadly, social democratic
nation states with encompassing representation by trade unions and employer
associations. Since neoliberalism acquired hegemonic status and China’s role
in world trade changed and grew, that world no longer exists and former ILO
staffer, Standing (2008), has been stinging in his criticism of the failure of the
ILO to adapt to the changed environment under globalization. In particular,
he highlighted the institutional design of the ILO was one which was based
upon a European approach to labour issues, with the expectation that states
would agree and implement new ILO conventions. The supply chain model
poses huge questions for thismodel, and asDirectorGeneralRyder (2015:754)
stated “It makes less and less sense for the ILO to supervise its standards
nation state by nation state, on the basis of freely ratified Conventions, when
supply chains are cutting across those nation states”.
Thus, in addition to long-established conventions and their associated
labour standards, the ILO has become increasingly focussed on its Decent
Work agenda, defined as employment which,
involves opportunities for work that is productive and delivers a fair income;
provides security in the workplace and social protection for workers and their
families; offers better prospects for personal development and encourages social
integration; gives people the freedom to express their concerns, to organize and to
participate in decisions that affect their lives; and guarantees equal opportunities
and equal treatment for all (ILO 2007).
In 2016, the theme of the ILO International Labour Conference was ‘decent
work in global supply chains’ and under Guy Ryder’s leadership the ILO has
taken a more proactive role in relation to global supply chain governance
(Thomas and Turnbull 2018). However, the core dilemma we return to, is that
all the aforementioned initiatives lackmechanisms bywhich theymay be easily
enforced (Compa 2008).
3. Implementation of standards and rules and the corporation’s duty to respect
business and human rights at work: the story so far …
The foregoing discussion suggests that standards of good practice are clearly
articulated, the issue is how they operationalized in the rules that govern work
and industrial relations. Value chains have been described as ‘infrastructures
for the flow of rules’ (Bartley 2018a: 2), yet whomakes the rules and what they
govern is highly contested. In the context of highly competitive supply chain
relationships, employers’ hostility towards collective organization and joint
decision-making is equaled only by their antipathy to statutory regulation. At
different times and in different contexts, the corporation plays ‘multiple roles
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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—sponsor, inhibitor, and provider [of different types of rules]— in the drama
of global governance’ (Bartley 2018b: 158). Thus the proximity of business
interests to political influence provides a range of opportunities for corporate
intervention in the drafting and implementation of public regulation (Harvey
2005: 34) and supports the clear corporate predilection for unilateral private-
sector rule-making over terms of employment (Fransen 2012).
As noted, even if insistent on making their own rules, corporations have
an abundance of guidance to which to refer. The various international
standards are remarkably consistent in intent, even if exact wording differs,
and corporate commitments to the same broad principles regularly appear
in MNCs’ voluntary codes of practice, which are generally called Codes
of Conduct (CoC). CoCs are essentially corporate-driven, unilaterally
determined codes of standards on a range of matters. These include social
compliance which typically encompasses conditions of employment and
commitment to freedom of association (FoA). FoA is defined by the ILO in
its 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work as an
‘enabling right’ that empowers workers to defend their own collective interests
— just the thing, it seems, that employers, often with state silence if not
overt support, typically seek to suppress or evade. It is important here to
understand just how much opposition labour activists face on the ground.
It ranges from low level daily intimidation to naked violence (Anner 2015;
Bair et al. 2020; Jenkins 2013). For example, in 2018, at a first tier clothing
factory in India, supplyingmajorUS andAmerican brands, workers identified
as having spoken to a local trade union were dragged in front of other workers
by the management team, who then incited them to beat the trade union
sympathizers as people whose activism would close the factory down (Jenkins
2020a). In this case, exposure through an independent investigation by the
Worker Rights Consortium resulted in action by the brands supplied by the
factory, yet to that point neither the state nor the standard voluntary corporate
systems of auditing had addressed systemic violation of rights to freedom
of association. Thus while in theory, CoCs define the standards to which
many MNCs expect their subsidiaries and suppliers to adhere if they are to
maintain business, in practice violations of first principles may be tolerated or
overlooked in the value chain, or excused by ‘plausible deniability’ on the part
of the lead firm.
Here the work of Locke (2013) is pertinent, though to some extent his
assessment of CoCs has shifted in recent years. Using the case of Nike,
Locke and colleagues initially argued that CoCs could be useful in terms of
shifting suppliers from a compliance-based approach to a commitment-based
approach (Locke et al. 2007). Locke’s initial optimism about the potential
utility of CoCs was later tempered, as he concluded that as they mature,
implementation can significantly weaken, and when faced with the competing
demands of purchasing or procurement departments and the corporate
social responsibility (CSR) departments, the economic bottom-line generally
triumphs over social interests (Locke 2013). Distelhorst and colleagues (2017)
perhaps get to the crux of CoCs: while they may raise the floor in terms of
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basic standards, they quickly become an instrument of diminishing returns
once this level has been reached.
Typically, the implementation of CoCs is predicated upon the ‘reputational
investment’ of lead firms in the supply chain and the ‘assessment capacity’
of auditing and certification bodies to enforce them (Bartley 2018a: 2). While
proponents of the CSRapproach have suggested that lead firms play a positive
role in establishing private governance where effective public regulation goes
unenforced (Scherer and Palazzo 2007), such initiatives have proven equally
unreliable in the absence of robust and binding mechanisms of enforcement
(Locke 2013). Examples of transgressions are legion and appear in tier one
firms with relatively close connections to the lead firm just as much as in
second and third tier workplaces further down the supply chain (e.g. Anner
2019; Hammer and Plugor 2019; Jenkins 2020a,b; Jenkins and Blyton 2017;
Kuruvilla et al. 2020; Mezzadri 2014).
As an example of systemic failure in enforcement, the Ali Enterprises
factory fire in Pakistan in 2012 is as illuminating as it is distressing. Ali
Enterprises was a tier one supplier of clothing to a European brand, Kik.
The brand required its suppliers to be certified as compliant with the
standard SA 8000. This is a recognized international standard promulgated
by Social Accountability International — itself an international NGO— for
social compliance and safety. The auditing of suppliers for the purposes of
certification was delegated to an Italian auditing firm, RINA, which in turn
charged local auditors in Pakistan with the local audit. The factory was duly
certified as a safe and compliant workplace. Just a few short weeks after SA
8000 certificationwas approved at the factory, a fire erupted in which some 500
workers found themselves trapped with just one viable exit from the premises.
While exact facts were contested by the brand and the employer, survivors
claimed that factory doors and fire exits were either obstructed or locked,
windows were barred and there was an absence of fire-fighting equipment. It
is estimated that around 262 people died in the blaze and a further unspecified
number of people (in the region of around 50) were injured as they tried to
escape (Jenkins 2020b; Terwindt and Saage-Maas 2016). Small wonder that,
at the grass roots, voluntary codes and auditing have little credibility left to
lose.
Scholars such as Le Baron (Fransen and Le Baron 2019; Le Baron and
Lister 2015) and Banerjee (2008) have argued that private regulation does
little more that give business a veneer of respectability. As a key feature
of the neoliberal environment, private governance constitutes initiatives led
by corporations, with or without civil society input, supposedly to create
systems of rules to constrain the actions of their suppliers (Donaghey et al.
2014; Fransen 2012). It is, in the last analysis, an example of top–down
unilateral rule-making which appears to depoliticize labour standards while
acting in a highly political manner to promote a positive image for lead
firms—particularly those brands and retailers presiding over labour-intensive
supply chains — who may have little meaningful engagement with either their
suppliers or the workers for whom they refuse to accept liability (Banerjee
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2008: 64; Bartley 2018b; Le Baron et al. 2017). In this topsy-turvy ‘fissured’
world (Weil 2014) of the lead firms’ creation, they themselves cause and
police the problems that good supply chain governance might overcome. For
example, in the case of the garment supply chain in Bangladesh, Reinecke
and Donaghey (2020) highlight that while the CSR activities of MNCs did
activate workplace representation on worker participation committees, many
of the problems raised byworkers in these forums originated inwhat have been
termed the ‘predatory purchasing practices’ of those same lead firms (see also
Anner 2019). Thus, MNCs are creating governance structures to deal with
problems which they themselves generate, thereby privileging themselves as
judge and jury in cases of their own violations.
The ‘story so far’ may seem an unduly pessimistic assessment of the
contribution of GVCs to worker empowerment and enrichment. To be clear, it
is not being disputed here that economic growth has emancipatory potential.
Our critique, put simply, is that the gap between the hopes and concrete
experience of labour has proved considerable. This is not a conclusion
restricted to place or to be defined by the increasingly misleading conception
of a global ‘north–south’ divide. The work of Pulignano, Hammer and
Doerflinger (this volume, 2020), for example, analyses value chains across
two countries in two beverages industries in Europe. These supply chains are
essentially confined to production and labour markets in developed market
economies. Nevertheless, despite their position in what might be understood
a more privileged ‘global north’ location, Pulignano et al.’s pessimistic
conclusion is that their case ‘illustrates a concomitant transnational trend of
deteriorating working conditions, stemming from overall chain governance
(2020, online copy page 1).
Gagliardi et al. (2020, this volume) strike a similar theme and further
illuminate employment outcomes in general and the female wage gap in
particular, by relating wages to the position of suppliers within the value
chain. A well-established literature suggests that women have generally been
exploited as a plentiful and easily replaceable source of ‘cheap labour’ rather
than a unique or valued source of human capital in GVCs (e.g. Caraway
2007, Morris 1987; Munck 2002; Newsome et al. 2015). Internationally,
female workforces all too often experience ‘a decent work deficit with few
rights, limited protection, and a lack of voice or freedom to organize through
independent unions’ (Barrientos et al. 2019: 732). However, Gagliardi et al.
(2020) add to this general picture by demonstrating that it is not only ongoing
traditions of gendered work but also the position of the firm in the value
chain that affects employment outcomes for women in GVCs (Gagliardi et al.
2020: p. 1 in online version). The authors analysed the wages of workers
dependent on their firm’s ‘upstreamness’ defined as its position in the value
chain in relation to the ‘steps before the production of a firm meets final
demand’. Using quantitative, macro-level data matching two datasets from
employers and employees in Belgium, their study poses two fundamental
questions, first, does upstreamness confer a wage premium upon workers in
GVCs and second, does this differ between male and female workers? Their
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findings suggest that even within a single country context, higher wages are
found upstream in the GVC, which is perhaps unsurprising given the primary
rationale for firms to outsource may be to achieve labour cost advantages (as
well as harvesting favourable tariffs and state-driven incentives). The finding is
nevertheless important, first for being quantitatively confirmed and second for
revealing how much more it affects women, with females likely to suffer three
times the disadvantage compared with males, being doubly disadvantaged by
the position of the firm and their position within the firm. Indeed, the article
contends that there are limited financial benefits of working in an upstream
setting for women.
Thus despite myriad standards and stated intentions, it is difficult to come
to any other conclusion than we have — hitherto at least — been unable
to rely on the rule makers to enforce their rules in the absence of binding
mechanisms of enforcement. Put simply, in serving vested interests in capital
accumulation, those with sociopolitical-economic power, in government and
in business, choose not to enforce rules and standards designed to protect the
powerless. In the following section, we consider different and evolving sources
of regulation in GVCs and their potential as sources of future remedy.
4. Twentieth century gains lost and twenty-first century institutions to build:
the multi-layering of private and public rules and regulation as a source of
remedy?
To this point in the debate, our observations suggest that standards of
equal treatment and fair wages and bargaining institutions that were once
established in so-called mature industrialized settings can no longer be taken
for granted. Fine (2017: 359) gets to the crux of the matter when she
says that the ‘decentralised structures of twenty-first century production …
[are] … explicitly designed to evade twentieth-century laws and enforcement
capabilities’ (emphasis added). Thus in so-called mature economies decades
of ‘informalizing’, ‘modernizing’, ‘liberalizing’ and ‘flexibilising’ work has
fissured employment relationships and dismantled labour’s limited gains
(Standing 2011; Weil 2014), while in the newly industrializing regions that
dominate today’s sites of production, formal employment relationships were
rarely the norm. As Munck notes (2002: 5) ‘[w]ork has always been unstable
for the majority of the world’s workers, and now this reality has become
generalised due to globalisation’. Asymmetric power relations and a range of
institutional barriers (e.g. Anner 2015; Bartley 2018a; Jenkins 2015) mean that
collective bargaining is now a distant prospect for the majority of the world’s
workers, as is the enforcement of employment rights predicated on some form
of formality or non-binding principles of good practice.
In this context, scholars and campaigners have displayed an increasing
interest in the multi-layering of private- and public-sector rules (Bair et al.
2020; Bartley 2011) and a range of transnationally focused initiatives such
as legislation for corporate liability throughout the supply chain, plus other
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binding instruments to make companies legally accountable for their extra-
territorial activities outside their nation state. The list of endeavours to
establish binding mechanisms is lengthening. For example, legislation in
countries such as the United Kingdom (LeBaron and Rükhmorf 2017;
Mantouvalou 2018) and Australia (Landau andMarshall 2018) aims to make
firms accountable for forced labour and modern slavery transnationally. In
addition, other similar types of legislation include the Loi de Vigilence in
France (Evans 2020), US law covering conflict minerals contained in the
Dodd–Franks Act (Reinecke and Ansari 2016), and EU and US laws that
penalize the sale of illegally harvested wood and forestry products anywhere
in the world (Bartley, 2018: 264). All the aforementioned examples represent
legislative initiatives that contain as their core provisions liability for actions of
MNCs for sourcing actions carried out in other countries. There are significant
challenges involved in the enforcement of such legislation, however, and the
process is generally lengthy, expensive and complex (see, e.g. Scherrer 2017),
while all the while access to employment rights and independent freedom of
association, which might deliver bargained concessions without recourse to
the courts, is barred by a range of means.
The search for new ways of resolving timeless problems continues, and
the institutions of industrial relations which we have formerly relied upon
are being revisited in new contexts. Within the industrial relations approach,
the focus has generally been placed on the extent to which workers have
access to joint regulation andmeaningful input to jointly agreed rules through
representatives to whom they delegate their authority. One of the main aims
of the ILO is to establish principles of social dialogue at the international
level as one of the supportive conditions, or ‘pillars’ of decent work (Ryder
2015). This is no easy task where the broader context for trade unionism
is generally hostile. Who, therefore, provides a voice for workers over their
work? In the absence of associational and structural power at the point
of the employment relationship, workers are increasingly forced to rely on
international instruments in securing some bargaining foothold at the local
level. One possibility is that the International Framework Agreements (IFAs),
negotiated by the Global Union Federations (GUFs) can contribute to this
end and may help secure agreements to develop industrial relations in supply
chains. Since the first IFA was concluded in 1989 between Danone and the
GUF the International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant,
Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers’ Associations, the take up has been far
from spectacular: the website Global Unions listed 113 IFAs in existence in
January 2017. Where they are procedurally based, the emphasis is generally
on issues around the rights of workers to organize and to take collective
action in line with ILOCore Conventions. Those agreements which have more
substantive comments generally are focused on establishing minimum floors
of substantive conditions upon which local unions can build.
While they are voluntary in nature, IFAs are subject to the associational
power of the GUF in terms of their enforcement (Niforou 2014). Due to
the wide variety of countries covered by IFAs, they often take the form of
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procedural agreements where focus is placed on companies agreeing with
the GUFs that the ILO Fundamental rights are implemented throughout
the company (Hammer 2005). Thus the aim of the IFA is to ‘extend labour
rights within the global operations of a particularMNC’, yet the supply chain
complicates things as within IFAs there is often ‘an incomplete conception of
regulation through subcontractor chains’ (Davies et al. 2011: 124–25). While
there are some exceptions, the scope of IFAs has generally been restricted
to those directly employed by the corporation and its subsidiaries. In this
circumstance, the local context is crucial (Davies et al. 2011: 125) as while
subcontractors are more likely to offer worse conditions and be more in
need of meaningful labour governance mechanisms, it may be these very
subcontractors who are not covered by the IFA. To some extent, it could be
said that the IFA approach to regulating work has as its focus themanagement
of relations within MNCs, rather than the broader but concrete effects of
supply chain models on work and employment (Wilkinson et al. 2001). Yet,
there is scope in IFAs to develop the international leverage necessary to
the establishment of tripartite agreements and perhaps legally binding due
diligence in supply chains, a point to which the discussion will return as we
consider future developments in GVCs.
A number of studies have recently emergedwhich look at the issue of labour
leverage (Niforou 2014; Wright 2016). In particular, Wright (2016) highlights
how brands have become key targets in implementing governance initiatives
and this is of relevance forGansemans et al.’s (2020, this volume) contribution
to this volume, in which they highlight the major challenges of achieving
‘social dialogue’ in a hostile environment for trade unionism. Their case is set
in the Costa Rican pineapple industry where there was no IFA to reference,
but rather an international alliance of civil society organizations, including
trade unions (EUROBAN), used a consumer campaign that highlighted
poor working conditions and violations of trade union rights. Leverage
resulting from the campaign was used to pressure the international buyer
to exert its influence over its suppliers to establish social dialogue at the
point of production. This contributed to the international buyer performing a
brokerage role between local trade unions and employers, thereby highlighting
the ways ‘institutions change through (inter)actions of multiple actors’
(Gansemans et al. 2020, p. 2 online version). Their article highlights the ways
in which a multiplicity of actors — employers, workers, civil society, multi-
stakeholder initiatives, trade unions and brands — in the international arena
provide opportunities that may, ultimately, assist in the attainment of better
work. The role of lead firm as broker in Gansemans et al.’s (2020) case is an
example of the multiple, simultaneous functions undertaken by international
capital (Bartley 2018a). However, it must be remembered that at the centre of
the entire debate over the regulation of work in GVCs, particularly in labour-
centred efficiency–drivenGVCs, lies the predisposition of international buyers
to avoid regulation and governance, particularly public regulation. Ganseman
et al.’s (2020) example highlights the scope that now exists for the corporation
to occupy different roles, in this case as a promoter of worker representation in
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a price-sensitive supply chain over which they preside.While support for social
dialogue might at first glance appear incompatible with corporate interests,
there may be no contradiction in operation as having the discretion to occupy
different roles may simply increase the scope for corporate power to choose
priorities and mould behaviours throughout the supply chain.
In a similar agricultural setting, in this case tea plantation pickers in Sri
Lanka, Thomas (2020, this volume) also charts the progress of social dialogue,
characterized as relatively ‘soft’ regulation with a relatively low power base,
that originates in an alliance between local unions and the ILO rather than
the lead firm. Thomas (2020, 1) argues that trade union intervention allied
with the engagement of the ILO, provides the basis of institutional power that
allows unions to leverage not only international standards but also national
regulation. In common with other critical studies, Thomas (2020) finds
little direct evidence of the efficacy of consumer-driven, private, voluntary
regulation in this context (e.g. through the Rainforest Alliance, UTZ Certified
and the Ethical tea Partnership). Indeed, it is possible that such forms of
consumer certification may have a negative impact on the potential of binding
regulation as they offer a veneer of respectability to very poor labour practices.
Rather, Thomas argues that conditions of work are defended via the strategic
position of the plantations in the value chain and this, in turn, is linked with
regulation enforced by associations with political parties and residual ethnic
ties within and between nation states (in this case Sri Lanka and India).
In Thomas’s case, local tea sector unions, in collaboration with the ILO,
have enabled workers to leverage institutional power through national and
international labour standards to reinforce decent work for these workers who
are at the bottom of the value chain. This is a specific (and possibly unusual)
institutional context and contrasts with less favourable institutional, and anti-
union contexts elsewhere. There are plentiful examples of political influence
being far more malign, where conditions have been far less favourable for
institutions such as the ILO, and private and public regulation has proved
difficult to enforce, the Bangladeshi garment sector being one such case in
point (Bair et al. 2020).
In contrast with the agricultural settings examined by Thomas and
Gansemans et al., Campling et al. (2020, this volume) present an examination
of a relatively complex value chain, the Korean auto industry, where
regulation is driven by a supranational governmental body, namely, the EU,
in the formof an international free trade agreement (FTA). This contextmight
seem to provide more fertile ground for regulation, in a sector with far higher
profit margins, with the value chain primarily located in a medium waged
economy (South Korea) and labour conditions (including wages) regulated
at the political level of the EU. Specifically, Campling et al. (2020) focus on
the production networks of the Hyundai Motor Group (HMG), the primary
Korean auto group and the world’s third largest group, and a trade agreement
between the EU and South Korea. The FTA contained specific provisions
to promote and protect labour standards. Such provisions might seem to
provide a more favourable basis for decent work as the agreement is both
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government-promoted and with an explicit intent. Despite this, Campling
et al.’s (2020) meticulous analysis of the interaction of the trade agreement
with the HMG production network and South Korea’s wider political
economy reveals the ways in which the possibilities of the FTA’s labour
provisions were limited in practical application. Drawing on multiple
interviews with relevant stakeholders, Campling et al. (2020) advance a ‘multi-
scalar conception of the labour regime as an analytical intermediary between
GPNs andFTAs’, showing how the FTA’s provisions erodedHMG’s domestic
market and hence profitability, and thus had deleterious consequences for
auto workers, and in particular peripheral immigrant workers.
5. Concluding thoughts and a future research agenda
Building institutions for the regulation of work is fraught with difficulties
in the current neoliberal environment. The articles in this volume testify
to the challenges of regulating transnational space, indicating that worker
outcomes are a complex combination of national context and corporate
positioning. Having considered the range of means, from CoCs to FTAs,
currently utilized as mechanisms for international regulation, the outcomes
suggest that prospects for labour do not look good. International standards
of good practice in work and employment are clear and widely disseminated,
yet without robust enforcement all forms of regulation fail in implementation
(e.g. Bartley 2018; Kuruvilla et al. 2020; Locke 2013).
By its very nature, neoliberalism is about removing constraints on market
activity and as Hathaway (2020) highlights, a defining feature of recent
decades has been the endowment of power in corporations vis-à-vis citizens
and government. In this context, corporations and states declare their
commitment to principles of human rights yet continue to allow the exclusion
of the independent voice of organized labour in society and at the workplace.
While competitive tensions play out between capital at different points of the
supply chain, themultiple roles of the lead firm allow them to act as the rescuer
of locally situated labour while disclaiming responsibility for the squeezing
of their suppliers’ margins — a factor closely associated with labour’s ills.
The consequent contradictory cycle of leverage and power within the GVC
may vary somewhat according to product, place and time, but with one
clear continuity: this way of regulating the worker’s lived experience of their
workplace in an unequal world simply is not delivering decent work for the
majority of the world’s workers.
It is past time to accept that change is needed if we are to move forward
into anything resembling a sustainable or equitable world of work. Uneven
development and inequality mean that workers regularly encounter the
problem Cohen (1988: 243–45) defined as the difference between ‘being free
to do something’ and ‘doing something freely’. Being free to take a job will
depend on there being a ‘reasonable or acceptable alternative course’ and for
many of the world’s poorest workers, including those displaced by economic
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distress, conflict or political repression, such an alternative is closed to them.
It is a sad indictment of the international economy that in 2016 the ILO
estimated 16 million people worldwide were in forced labour in the private
economy. Of the 16 million, more than b (57.6 per cent) were female and
across all occupations, some 51 per cent of the total were in debt bondage,
defined as a situation in which personal debt is used to coerce labour (ILO
2017: 11). Let us not be blind to the fact that many will be labouring in
global supply chains, while millions of others — though perhaps marginally
less disadvantaged and notionally ‘free’ — may nevertheless find that basic
conditions of employment such as regular and reasonable hours of work,
living wages and leave entitlements are increasingly out of reach. This is the
world of work in 2020.
How may this be remedied? Of the various forms of regulation discussed
in this article none is perfectly equipped to remedy all wrongs. However,
while transnational regulation is as yet ineffective in guaranteeing business
and human rights, it is increasingly difficult to conclude that the system
doing anything but working exactly as intended: no rule can be taken to have
serious intent without a corresponding mechanism of enforcement. Concrete
experience shows that we cannot always rely on the state, nor on different
modes of private regulation, or indeed philanthropic activity to emancipate
and empower workers.
Real progress in international labour rights does not lie in top–down
‘gifting’ of better labour conditions but rather in the repositioning of labour.
Our prescription for the future of work begins with the recognition that
supply chain liability must be made easier to prosecute and workers must be
seen as having a legitimate place in the process of bargaining and decision
making, so that their collective voice is made audible through the ‘enabling
right’ of freedom of association (Dawkins 2012) and has a legitimate and
meaningful place in the workplace industrial relations of theGVC. There have
been high-profile developments in binding tripartite forums and mandatory
due diligence (though sadly such initiatives have typically been in response
to tragedy and exposure of gross exploitation). For example, the Bangladesh
Accord on Fire and Safety established post-Rana Plaza (Donaghey and
Reinecke 2018; Reinecke and Donaghey 2015) and the ILO’s Better Work
Lesotho (Pike 2020) programme were each created as binding forums whereby
international capital afforded international and locally organized labour
a place at the international bargaining table. As Donaghey and Reinecke
(2018: 14) point out in the case of the Accord, which they argue is
underpinned by an approach of trying to create transnational industrial
democracy, ‘those affected by governance need to be part of it’ if it is to be
meaningful.
The intersection of public and private regulation in this way (particularly
with binding obligations enforceable in law) might offer a way forward
to improving labour conditions as well as supporting rights to freedom
of association (Barrientos et al. 2019; see also Pike 2020). That said, we
should not be naïve about a new dawn. For example, research by Bair et al.
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(2020: 1) suggests there are ongoing and concerted efforts on the part of
the Bangladeshi state to undermine the Accord and its ‘effective private
regulation’ because the state itself is ‘opposed to pro-labour reforms’. Any
hope of rigorous enforcement of labour standards, be they statutory or
otherwise, is certainly forlorn where a key principle of the UNGP and ILO
standards — the right to freedom of association — is denied, suppressed or
systematically opposed in this manner by state power.
In conclusion, the relative merits of public and private regulation have
been hotly contested, but are becoming a rather sterile debate as it is clear
neither form of regulation works in the absence of robust enforcement.
Rather, scholarly attention is turning to how these different streams of
regulation intersect, how binding commitments may be established and how
the regulatory capacity of international capital, labour and the state may vary,
conflict and coalesce. It is clear that the role of the corporation as selective
champion of some forms of regulation over others can take many forms, and
that its relationshipwith the statematters. Thus the state remains an influential
actor, even if the way that influence is felt is as a creator of regulatory absence,
inaction or action, in favour of business interests (e.g. Bair et al. 2020; Bartley
2018a; Fine and Bartley 2019). We know what happens because we see the
outcomes for labour, but detailed analysis of exactly how the diverse roles of
state and corporation intersect in the politics of the GVC promises fruitful
insights into how the rules that govern transnational industrial relations may
continue to evolve.
Note on Covid-19
While these papers were written pre-COVID, as in many facets of life, it is
impossible to ignore (and difficult to look beyond) the long- and short-term
impacts of COVID-19 on global supply and value chains. As argued earlier,
GVCs are essentially a response to neoliberal capitalism, to deregulation
and to the incessant search for lower labour costs. One consequence is that
they are extremely fragile. In both senses, they borrow from previous supply
chain innovations of the 1980s and onwards, namely, the just-in-time/ Lean
Production/ Toyota System (Morris and Imrie 1991). A central tenet of
this system was to minimize labour costs by subcontracting production to
lower cost producers and minimizing inventory. This lowered wages for those
producing components in the supply chain, reduced union strength as these
subcontractors were sometimes smaller and non-unionized (particularly in
tier 2 and 3 suppliers) and introduced a degree of fragility. Indeed fragility (or
rather agility) was a selling point of the system, at least from the perspective
of consultants and business gurus.
The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the problematic nature of this
fragility, and its dramatic, negative, consequences for workers in these GVCs,
both in mature and emerging industrialized economies. We will use an
example from the authors’ research as an illustrative example. Hassard and
Morris’s (2020) research on the impact of COVID-19 on work, included
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several companies whowere involved in relatively high-techGVCs in software,
telecoms and consulting. In the short term, the lockdown of their Indian
workforce caused the IT and consulting firms problems, but very quickly,
once it was apparent that face-to-face engagement with UK workers was no
longer possible, they outsourced even more of their UK-based operations to
India, where labour costs are far lower. Meanwhile, in India, the lockdown
exposed the vast numbers of rural migrants labouring in cities who are
creating value for international firms right at the heart of the GVC while
employed through labour agents and other ‘middle-men’ on low wages and
insecure contracts. Prior to the pandemic, such employment practices were
obscured from scrutiny by the exercise of ‘plausible deniability’, defined as
a process of ‘withholding or deliberately not acknowledging information by
those in power … [in order to] … deny any involvement with certain actions
or developments with a reasonable degree of believability’ (Srinivasan 2020).
Such conditions are not restricted to place or product in the dynamics of
today’s GVC.
The impact on the labour-intensive GVCs in east and south Asia has
indeed been dramatic, in its consequences, in its context (with a lack of any
national welfare support) and in its scale. For example, Anner (2020) carried
out a survey of 316 Bangladeshi garment factories in March 2020, when the
lockdownswere occurring inmajorwesternmarkets and retailers were closing.
He found that nearly half of the lead firms, that is international brands
and retailers, had cancelled not only future but also completed orders, three
quarters were refusing to pay for raw materials already used on these orders
and that 58 per cent of suppliers had shut down all or most of their factories.
Such actions were widespread across the sector in producing countries such as
Cambodia,Myanmar, China and Central America (Anner 2020) and involved
suppliers to major UK retailers such as Primark and Matalan (Kelly 2020).
Across the region, these actions led to millions of garment workers being sent
home without pay and the fragility of low paid insecure work was laid bare
by extreme economic distress. It is also clear that, as reported by the Business
andHumanRights Resource Centre (2020) and the Clean Clothes Campaign,
re-employment has been selective and has targeted union organizers at plants
for dismissal. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, long-standing abuses in the
garment sector — the subject of decades of research — were only fully
brought to public attention when a spike in Covid-19 cases in Leicester
were in part attributed to the garment workshops that had continued to
operate through lockdown. The short-lived media attention embarrassed one
of the main sourcing brands, Boo-hoo, but once more ‘plausible deniability’
had long hidden the abuse and exploitation that has been the subject of
decades of painstaking research in the sector (Hammer 2020; Hammer and
Plugor 2019).
Such examples highlight the interconnectedness of the value chain and
serve to emphasize that the old global north–south or east–west divisions
are increasingly inappropriate to our analysis. When it comes to conditions
of work and employment, labour competes on an uneven international
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stage where inequality generally drives exploitation. The risk is that far
from being taken as an opportunity to create a better world, Covid-19 may
exacerbate abuses. For example, in May 2020 the Indian state of Uttar
Pradesh enacted the ‘Uttar Pradesh Temporary Exemption from Certain
Labour Laws Ordinance, 2020’ in the interest of ‘reviving the economy’ in
the wake of India’s first wave of Covid-19. Under this ordinance the Uttar
Pradesh government has suspended 35 of its 38 labour laws for a period
of three years. Statutes suspended included The Minimum Wages Act, The
Maternity Benefit Act, The Equal Remuneration Act, The Trade Unions
Act, The Industrial Employment Act, The Industrial Disputes Act and The
Factories Act (Aswathi, 2020). If this is what it takes to be competitive in
the international market-place for labour, it bodes very ill. In this context,
it is essential to equality of opportunity, economic and social stability
and the ethics of production, that we regulate and enforce rules for better
work and employment in the GVC. The alternative is a dangerous spiral
downward.
Final version accepted on 8 October 2020
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